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SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY IN THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS? 
Dr. Rory O’Connell* †
The European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) has a distinguished 
track record. Established under the European Convention on Human Rights 
1950 (“ECHR”), it was the world’s first international human rights court. It 
decides thousands of cases every year, and its opinions are cited world-
wide. For most of its history, the Court’s jurisprudence on equality was un-
inspiring, as it was based on a formal conception of equality. In recent years, 
however, the ECtHR has begun to give equality more substantive content.  
ECtHR’s weak equality jurisprudence resulted from the limitations of 
ECHR, judicial procedure, and a formal conception of equality. Article 14 of 
ECHR only applies in respect to the enjoyment of Convention rights: “The 
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground . . . .” Procedurally, only al-
leged victims can bring complaints (apart from states), and they must first 
exhaust domestic remedies in the member state. Furthermore, as an eviden-
tiary matter, the ECtHR has been reluctant to draw inferences of 
discrimination from statistics. By far the most limiting factor, though, was 
the ECtHR’s formal notion of discrimination, which focused on direct dis-
crimination. The Court has had difficulty with cases involving covert 
discrimination or disparate impact discrimination (indirect discrimination).  
During the last decade, however, the ECtHR started to develop a sub-
stantive conception of equality. In contrast to formal equality, a substantive 
conception takes into account how victims experience the reality of dis-
crimination. The central question is not whether the law makes distinctions, 
nor whether the state is motivated by prejudice, but whether the effect of the 
law is to perpetuate disadvantage, discrimination, exclusion, or oppression. 
A substantive equality doctrine responds to the effects of structural inequal-
ity where it is not possible to identify a specific “wrongdoer” who causes 
the discrimination.  
I. The Developing Substantive Equality Jurisprudence 
Some of the most important developments of substantive equality juris-
prudence have come in cases dealing with discrimination in education (a 
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right under Article 2 of the First Protocol to the ECHR). Throughout Eu-
rope, nomadic communities such as Roma, Travellers, and Sinti, have 
experienced educational discrimination and disadvantage. Indeed, according 
to the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Alvaro Gil-
Robles, “segregation in education . . . is a common feature in many Council 
of Europe member states.”  
In DH v. Czech Republic, the ECtHR addressed “special schools” in the 
Czech Republic for pupils with mental “deficiencies.” The children in these 
schools were disproportionately of Roma origin—a Roma child was 27 
times more likely to be sent to a special school than a non-Roma student. In 
Oršuš v. Croatia, the Court dealt with Croatian schools that had established 
classes exclusively for Roma students due to their difficulties with the Croat 
language. Finally, in Sampanis v. Greece, the Court dealt with segregated 
preparatory classes as a result of protests from non-Roma parents. Finding a 
violation of Article 14 in both DH and Sampanis, the ECtHR decisions in 
these cases demonstrate a more substantive conception of equality. This is 
especially true of the landmark decision of DH, which was decided by the 
Grand Chamber (the most solemn formation of the ECtHR). 
These cases are interesting both procedurally and substantively. They 
show a pragmatic attitude toward the requirement that an applicant exhaust 
domestic remedies. The Grand Chamber in DH stressed that this obligation 
must be interpreted flexibly, taking account of both the general context in 
the State and the circumstances of the applicant. Accordingly, the Court re-
quired the state to prove that the domestic remedies were, in practice, 
available and effective. Also of interest was the role played by representa-
tive organizations in these cases. In each case, the applicants were 
represented by nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) and their legal 
advisers. These NGOs included groups with records of public interest litiga-
tion, such as the European Roma Rights Centre (“ERRC”). The Grand 
Chamber in DH was also willing to hear from eight NGOs as third party 
interveners. This flexibility was welcome for several reasons: Without the 
backing of an NGO, individual victims may lack the resources to mount a 
complex legal challenge and may be more easily subject to pressure. Fur-
ther, human rights cases often raise issues that go beyond the isolated facts 
of an individual complaint, and hearing from interveners allows for wider 
considerations to be taken on board.  
It is also welcome that DH interpreted the ECHR in light of develop-
ments in equality law in other jurisdictions. The European Union, U.N. 
bodies, the U.S. Supreme Court (in Griggs v. Duke Power), and other na-
tional courts have adopted a systematic approach to indirect discrimination. 
The Grand Chamber’s interpretation of its previous case law brought it in 
line with these European and international precedents. The Grand Chamber 
ruled that once an applicant demonstrated a discriminatory effect, the bur-
den switched to the State to justify its actions under the Court’s justification 
test. Contrary to the initial Chamber ruling in DH, the Grand Chamber held 
that it was not necessary to prove any intention to discriminate in indirect 
discrimination cases.  
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II. Proving Discriminatory Effect 
In DH, statistical evidence indicated that Roma children were far more 
likely than other children to be placed in special schools. The Grand Cham-
ber followed E.U. and international precedents in holding that “reliable and 
significant” statistics could be used to prove a discriminatory effect (though 
such effect also could be proved without statistics). The Grand Chamber 
also used other sources to understand the background. Lacking the resources 
to carry out its own fact-finding investigation, the Court relied on reports by 
non-judicial institutions, such as the Commissioner for Human Rights, the 
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (“ECRI”), and the 
Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention on National Minorities, 
to conclude that there was evidence of discriminatory effect.  
In Sampanis, the ECtHR concluded that the applicant had adduced 
enough evidence to justify a strong presumption that there was discrimina-
tion. This evidence included a local official’s call for an informal meeting to 
oppose the registration of Roma pupils. Also, Greek law and policy toler-
ated the possibility of separate education for Roma students. Most 
strikingly, there was racist opposition from non-Roma locals to the inclusion 
of Roma children. These facts justified a presumption that there was covert 
racial discrimination in the case. 
Once the applicant proves a discriminatory effect, the burden switches 
to the State to justify its policy by proving that it is necessary to achieve a 
legitimate aim. This is the ECtHR’s justification test. The Grand Chamber in 
DH stressed that in cases of racial discrimination justification must be “in-
terpreted as strictly as possible.” In DH, the State failed to justify its 
policies. The Czech government argued that the decision to place the Roma 
children in special schools was based on their performance in psychological 
tests. The Grand Chamber, drawing on reports from the ECRI, the Advisory 
Committee of the Framework Committee on National Minorities, and the 
Commissioner for Human Rights, observed that these tests were not reliably 
objective because they were based on the experiences of the majority Czech 
population and made no allowance for cultural differences. Further, the 
Czech policies lacked satisfactory safeguards—particularly to ensure that 
the specificity of the Roma culture was respected. In Sampanis, the State 
failed to offer a convincing explanation to justify the special treatment of 
the Roma children. The ECtHR rejected the State’s arguments that the chil-
dren had not satisfied all the formalities for joining the regular school. In 
view of the vulnerable position of the Roma, the ECtHR held that local offi-
cials should have waived certain formalities to ensure Roma children 
received education.  
Of the three cases, the Government only successfully justified discrimi-
natory treatment in Oršuš. The ECtHR accepted that the applicant children 
had difficulties with the Croat language. The classes were preparatory in 
nature, run in mainstream schools, and students could transfer to regular 
classes when ready. In most of the schools, the majority of Roma were in 
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Decisions of the ECtHR may fail to address the wider reality on the 
ground. A dissenting judge in DH noted that the Court dealt with one spe-
cific issue in the Czech Republic while passing over the more serious 
problem of hundreds of thousands (perhaps millions) of Roma children in 
Europe who would not receive any formal education. The majority’s deci-
sion would do nothing to assist these young Roma. Further, States do not 
mixed classes, and most of the applicants were eventually transferred to 
mainstream classes. This case has now been referred to the Grand Chamber. 
In DH and Sampanis, the governments argued that the parents’ consent 
to the placements had satisfied the justification test. Yet in DH, the Grand 
Chamber concluded that one could never waive the right not to be subject to 
racial discrimination. In reaching this conclusion, the Grand Chamber 
doubted the genuineness of the parents’ consent. The parents belonged to a 
“disadvantaged” and “often poorly educated” community. There was no 
evidence that they were presented with any detailed information about op-
tions or the effects of their choice, and further, they had been given a choice 
between sending their children to special schools or to mainstream schools 
where they “risked isolation and ostracism.” Though one dissenting judge 
castigated the majority for being patronizing in its attitude to the parents, 
these seem good reasons to regard the consent as inadequate. 
The absence of meaningful consent was even more apparent in Sampa-
nis. Here, the parents agreed to a separate (prefabricated) building for their 
children, but this consent was given under the pressure of demonstrations by 
large numbers of local parents who objected to the Roma children joining 
the mainstream school. Police were called in to assure order, and at one 
point, the building for the Roma children was attacked. The Court was skep-
tical of the value of consent in these circumstances. 
III. The Breakthrough and Looking Forward 
These cases, particularly DH, are a breakthrough for a more substantive 
model of equality in Strasbourg and are also a welcome provision of clear 
rules on indirect discrimination under Article 14. Yet these developments 
leave some questions to be explored, and there remain inadequacies in the 
ECHR framework for the protection of human rights. Delay is an endemic 
problem. The children in DH were in special schools from 1996–1999, and 
they lodged a complaint in the ECtHR in 2000. The Chamber decision came 
down in 2006 and the Grand Chamber decision a year later. By the time the 
Chamber decided the case, the Czech Republic had already introduced leg-
islation abolishing the special schools. Ironically, in Oršuš, the ECtHR 
censured Croatia for the failure to provide a speedy trial of the issues in the 
Constitutional Court; the delay in that case was four years. Delays are espe-
cially regrettable given the importance of these years in children’s 
education. The Council of Europe (“COE”) and the ECtHR are acutely 
aware of delay caused by the ECtHR’s backlog of cases, and unfortunately, 
one state (Russia) has made no effort to ratify a protocol reforming the 
ECtHR and its procedures. 
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always (and sometimes cannot) implement ECtHR decisions quickly. Look-
ing at the Czech response to DH, the ERRC reported that despite some 
progress, Roma children were still disproportionately sent to non-
mainstream schools. Local opposition and bureaucratic inertia (or resis-
tance) may be difficult to overcome. In the Sampanis case, following the 
attack on the separate school buildings for the Roma, it took five months to 
replace the buildings, and even then the replacements were not operational. 
As the initial special building was a prefabricated structure, it is not easy to 
see why replacing it was so difficult. Eventually, the Roma students were 
transferred to a new, specially created school.  
There are limits to the value of judicial activity, as these facts suggest. 
Importantly, the COE includes several non-judicial mechanisms. The COE 
Committee of Ministers monitors the implementation of ECtHR decisions, 
while several institutions mentioned above monitor the general situation 
regarding minority rights and racism in the member states. These mecha-
nisms lack the power to impose sanctions on recalcitrant states (apart from 
the theoretical threat of expulsion from the COE), but they can highlight 
problems of implementation and apply moral suasion.  
IV. Conclusion 
Article 14 jurisprudence has evolved from a formal to a more substan-
tive model of equality despite these worries about delay, implementation, 
and the capacity of courts to deal with wider structural problems. The Court 
is now more open to adopting a substantive equality perspective that 
stresses the need to protect vulnerable and disadvantaged minorities.  
